It is plausible that there might be different appearances of the phenomenological world. Every conscious observer might see the world as their own distinct representation and at the same time be fully synchronized with other observers; we can communicate and reach consensus as if we were seeing the exact same thing.
A similar thought experiment that has been explored historically is the observational relativity of colors.
Is there a way to alter one’s own view of the three-dimensional world, or is it hardwired into a particular body or organism, perhaps in the genes? Can this be achieved only through mental exercise, or does it require physical or bodily changes?
Some notions are indifferent with regard to their representation. They can be defined or subjectively conceptualized in different ways or shapes and still be the same referent. What really matters is the relative position they seem to occupy either in physical space or in the world of concepts. Examples are:
- Colors
- Three-dimensional spacetime
- Eternal recurrence (Nietzschean, existence repeats itself endlessly)
- Identical parallel universes (in case there are so many, or infinitely many, parallel universes that identical instances exist)
- Whether we are only our neural systems, connected information and senses, brains in vats, or simulations, or whether the actual world exists independently, it makes no difference experientially; we would have the same lived experience.
A crude abstraction for all the examples above is that it does not matter if the quality or the actual existence is singular or multiple.